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SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION, ROVING BIOLOGISM, AND
REASONABLE WOMEN: A RESPONSE
TO PROFESSOR EPSTEIN
Kathryn Abrams*
INTRODUCTION
Richard Epstein has presented us with an article that is provoca-
tive in more than its title. In Gender Is for Nouns,' he emphasizes
the role of biology in socially observable differences between men
and women, and previews his broader proposal for the repeal of em-
ployment discrimination laws.' In responding to ah article whose
perspectives and normative commitments lie at some distance from
my own, I will endeavor to meet the same goal Professor Epstein
sets for himself: to court controversy, while avoiding descent into the
merely "captious."
Professor Epstein's arguments rest on two primary persuasive ef-
forts. First, he seeks to persuade us that his principal oppo-
nents--those who view gender differences as socially con-
structed-seek to banish biological influences from their accounts of
differentiation between women and men. Second, Professor Epstein
hopes to demonstrate that Title VII seeks to erase all differ-
ences-whether biologically or socially created-between men and
women in the workplace, and impose an artificial, potentially costly,
identity. In this article, I will question both of these propositions.
First, I will address Professor Epstein's account of sex-or gen-
der-differences, explaining that, in theory and in practice, the posi-
tions of social construction advocates are considerably more com-
plex, and demonstrably more necessary, than Professor Epstein
suggests. Second, I will offer a competing view of Title VII litiga-
tion, one which suggests that antidiscrimination efforts have been
characterized by multiple remedial strategies, some of which may
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, and Associate Professor, Program on Ethics & Public
Life, Cornell University.
1. Richard A. Epstein, Gender Is for Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REV, 981 (1992).
2. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DIs-
CRIMINATION LAWS (1992).
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require revision, but few of which bear any resemblance to the rigid,
totalizing efforts Professor Epstein predicts.
I. BIOLOGY AND THE WORKPLACE
One might infer from Professor Epstein's account that proponents
of social construction-that is, those who believe that "gender" is
for something other than nouns-are a dominant, unitary force on
the contemporary political scene. My own experience in feminist
theory and politics suggests the contrary. First, although arguments
that institutional and social structures shape the attributes of those
who live under them are hardly new to the realm of social theory,
they have waged an uphill battle for influence in contemporary dis-
cussions of gender. Far more pervasive, in the history of arguments
about the role of women, are arguments tracing socially observable
differences to, or basing social or familial roles on, accounts of bio-
logical differentiation.
Second, the term advocates of social construction comprehends a
wide variety of theoretical and political positions. Not all advocates
agree, for example, that the most salient differences constructed are
those between men and women:3 Some focus, as we shall see, on the
social influences that create differences within these groupings.4
Moreover, while a few within this heading may attribute variations
to the amorphous "social order" to which Professor Epstein refers,
many others have become involved in the burgeoning project of
specifying the numerous, intersecting sources of social influence.5
3. One example of a feminist theorist of social construction who places primary emphasis on
the differences between women and men is Catharine MacKinnon. See CATHARINE A. M ACKIN-
NON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987). For critiques of MacKinnon's tendency to
neglect other differentiating influences or to assimilate other influences to those of gender, see
Kathryn Abrams, Feminist Lawyering and Legal Method, 16 LAW & Soc. INQ. 373 (1991);
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory. 42 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990).
4. See, e.g., GLORIA ANZALDUA, MAKING FACE, MAKING SOUL (HACIENDO CARAS): CREATIVE
AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES BY WOMEN OF COLOR (1990); ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL
WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Harris, supra note 3.
5. Differentiation, according to these emerging accounts, may be conditioned by law-from
federal statute to local workplace regulation-by public or private social practices of numerous
types, by the attitudes of government bureaucrats, by employers, or by spouses. For efforts along
these lines that specify the sources of social construction in different contexts, see ARLIE HOCH-
SCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT
HOME (1989) (examining work-family conflict); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and
Work: Judicial Interpretation of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising
the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990) (studying sex segregation in
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Perhaps most important, while some advocates of social construction
may seek to banish any trace of biological influence from their ac-
count of gender differences, many seek not to banish but to interro-
gate assertions of biological influence.' These theorists recognize
that neither the gathering nor the interpretation of biological data is
a value-free enterprise, that the investigation and articulation of bio-
logical differences, in this way, reflect the influence of social con-
struction. 7 They also understand that there is a complex, variable
pattern of interaction between these (socially constructed) biological
variables and other institutional or attitudinal influences. Thus, one
goal of social construction theorists comports with Professor Ep-
stein's project: the goal of analyzing the intersection of biological
and environmental influences.8 Another goal, that of checking broad
extrapolation from qualified biological evidence, is one that Profes-
sor Epstein claims to share. Yet several of his discussions display
more enthusiasm for extrapolation than for its limitation. A brief
review of some of these discussions reveals why the activity of social
construction theorists-far from being a blindered, dominant ac-
count-is a useful corrective to many popular, and some scholarly,
conceptions.
One might profitably begin with Professor Epstein's account of
the division of labor in the family. According to this understanding,
everything from maternal responsibility for child care to the sex seg-
regation of many workplaces seems to stem from one biological fact:
Women are physically capable of nursing small infants. This auto-
matically makes women "the better candidate[s] for staying with
the child,"9 which produces two adaptive consequences. First, the
woman develops "[t]he nurturing instincts . . . that reduce the cost
of doing activities that help promote the survival of both her and her
offspring." 10 Second, the man is free "to engage in a broad class of
explorative activities" and develop his abilities in spatial percep-
employment cases where the employer argued that women lacked interest in nontraditional jobs).
6. For a description of the different approaches of social scientists to evidence of biological
differences, see CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS: SEX. GENDER AND THE SO-
CIAL ORDER 50-51 (1988).
7. For two accounts of this interaction that differ in tone perhaps more than substantive analy-
sis, see CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 12-16, 17-45; CAROL TAVRIS, THE MISMEASURE
OF WOMAN 42-56 (1992).
8. See Epstein, supra note 1, Part II.
9. Id. at 990.
10. Id.
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tion." Although Professor Epstein concedes that "modern women
operate in settings far different from those of their ancient
mothers," he states that "the initial tendency still remains: If nur-
turing brings greater pleasure or requires lower cost for women than
for men, then we should expect to see women devote a greater per-
centage of their resources to it than men."12 The arrangement that
results "should be accepted for what it is: a healthy adaptation that
works for the benefit of all concerned, and not as a sign of inferi-
ority or disrespect."' 3 It is an arrangement that persists even as
women struggle into activities "that were once a male preserve":4
Their comparative weakness in spatial perception-which either was
or has become biologically ingrained-and their comparative
strength at nurturing make it preferable for them to turn in greater
numbers to counseling and guidance than to architecture.' 5
Many things about this explanation demand closer scrutiny, in
particular, the kind of scrutiny that many theorists of social con-
struction are equipped to provide. First, one might note that of all
the possible influences over the division of labor within the family,
Professor Epstein begins from a biological capacity that is no longer
inexorably linked to differentiation. Breast milk is not, nor has it in
memory been, the only alternative for nourishing infants. I was
formula-fed myself, and given the technology and the fashions of
the day, it seems likely that Professors Epstein and Strauss met a
similar fate. To enshrine this difference as central, at a time when
we have the technological capacity to generate adequate substitutes,
is a bit like describing the structure of contemporary society as aris-
ing from the human inability to master air travel. 6 However, Pro-
fessor Epstein argues that despite the changes wrought by contem-
porary technology, the critical seeds of differentiation have already
been sown: Once the adaptations described "become embedded in
the brain, the glacial pace of evolutionary change means that they
cannot be undone in an age when infant formula is a tolerable sub-
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 990-91 (arguing that women should be at a relative advantage in seeking counseling
and guidance positions "that demand more of the nurturing and intuitive skills associated with the
female roles in child rearing").
16. Cf. CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 70-71 (describing how "cultural and techno-
logical change can influence the impact of a group's biological heritage" and noting that "as
humans are ordered by nature, so too do they order it").
1024 [Vol. 41:1021
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stitute for mother's milk.' 1 7 So it seems that these adaptations also
require scrutiny.
The male adaptation is arguably more plausible, though it might
still be challenged as insufficiently empirically grounded or as inade-
quately explained. Some scholars have argued that differences in
spatial perception are reflected in, and reproductively transmitted
as, differences in the brain-although Professor Epstein's strong ver-
sion of these findings neglects qualifying warnings about the extrav-
agant and sometimes contradictory conclusions that have emerged
from theories of brain lateralization. 8 Moreover, it is not clear from
Professor Epstein's explanation why the initial division of labor aris-
ing from breastfeeding would necessarily reinforce these advantages.
Why should the male adventurer have more opportunity to develop
these capacities than the female, who is constantly balancing and
shifting her infants, or cannily judging the distance between her
children and danger?
The female adaptation-the development of a gender-wide capac-
ity for nurturance-is even more problematic. Nurturance is an atti-
tude, an attribute of personality. Only the most extreme proponents
of sociobiology-those who begin with Darwin and "extrapolate
from the species to the individual and from physical characteristics
to psychological ones"' 9-would assert that nurturance is or comes
to be embodied in a particular portion of the brain. Although it is
still unclear from his present argument whether Professor Epstein
seeks to join this small but hardy band,20 it may be useful to juxta-
pose a countervailing explanation offered by proponents of social
construction, one that reflects not only greater plausibility but the
analytic complexity of such efforts.
Nurturance is an attitudinal characteristic that arises in response
17. Epstein, supra note 1, at 990.
18. For a survey of the lateralization theories and the countervailing critiques and warnings, see
CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN. supra note 6, at 52-56; TAVRIS, supra note 7, at 43-56.
19. CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 47 (citing CAROL TAVRIS & CAROLE WADE,
THE LONGEST WAR: SEX DIFFERENCES IN PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 1984)). Prominent among the
sociobiologists thus described is entomologist Edward Wilson. See EDWARD 0. WILSON, ON
HUMAN NATURE (1978).
20. Professor Epstein does not explicitly ground his contentions about the transmission of nur-
turance to the work of sociobiologists; in fact, his description of how these characteristics are
passed from generation to generation of women is somewhat vague. See Epstein, supra note I, at
990 ("The nurturing instincts usually attributable to women are a set of attitudinal adaptations
that reduce the cost of doing activities that help promote the survival of both her and her off-
spring. Although mbdern women operate in settings far different from those of their ancient
mothers, the initial tendency still remains .... " (emphasis added)).
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
to certain circumstances and is passed on-to the extent that it is
not a function of continuing adaptation to changing circum-
stances-by women watching and mothering each other. It thus be-
comes important to ask: To what is nurturing a necessary adapta-
tion? It seems plausible that it was a response, at one time, to the
evidently restrictive need to feed an infant, from one's own body,
every few hours. But to describe it simply, and contemporarily, in
this way is to overlook the numerous social and attitudinal struc-
tures that grew up to reinforce women's restriction to these tasks.
These include the convictions of husbands, which may have emerged
originally to protect their access to the "broad class of explorative
activities" that women's childrearing labor permitted them, but con-
tinued in response to solidifying social convictions that childcare is
"women's work" or that it is a sign of a husband's weakness or fail-
ure to provide if a wife with children "has to work." Nurturance
may also have been an adaptation to limited opportunities for
women outside the home, which began with workplaces that ex-
cluded women entirely, excluded pregnant women as unseemly or
unfit, or regulated the hours of working women in deference to their
"first task" in the home.21 In more contemporary times, women's
decision to develop this aspect of their personalities may have re-
sponded to employers' failure to accommodate workers who are also
parents,22 or spouses' failure to share the domestic tasks that fall
disproportionately to mothers who continue to work.23 This explana-
tion should not be understood to undercut the value of nurturance,
or to deny that there are many attributes of small children that are
21. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908) (barring factory work by women for more
than ten hours a day on the ground that "as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring,
the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care"); Bradwell v.
Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (excluding women from the practice of
law on the ground that "[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.").
22. See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L, REV. 1183, 1184 (1989) (noting that "women are often channeled into jobs
that accord them little respect and few opportunities for advancement"); Mary Joe Frug, Securing
Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REV. 55, 55
(1979) (stating that "full and equal achievement in the work force is still beyond many women
because the structure of the labor market makes participation extremely difficult for individuals
with major child care responsibilities"); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 797, 801 (1989) (arguing that the relationship between work and family responsibilities is at
the "core of the contemporary gender system which systematically enriches men at the expense of
women and children").
23. See HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 5.
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attractive, lovable, or inducing of nurturant impulses. It is intended
simply to suggest that to describe nurturance as an adaptation to
the capacity to breastfeed, passed on through some variant of La-
marckian evolution, is to miss many features of the social world in
which human beings have evolved.
A third critical point of'controversy is Professor Epstein's conclu-
sion that because nurturance brings more pleasure or lower cost to
women than men, it should be accepted as a "healthy adaptation
that works to the benefit of all concerned."2 Setting aside the
doubts previously raised about the origins of this development, this
assertion makes the further error of confusing results that have
some biological basis with results that are socially or normatively
acceptable. This conflation, which is sometimes achieved through
the imposition of the term natural, is a primary subject of Professor
Strauss's response. 5 I would add only that in rhetorical terms, Pro-
fessor Epstein's argument rests more on the positive cost/benefit ra-
tios achieved through perpetuation of biologically based differences
than on an unreflective association of the "natural" with the norma-
tive, and that some of these cost/benefit conclusions do not with-
stand careful scrutiny. The lower cost of nurturance to women was
even arguably traceable to biological causes only when they were
the sole source of nourishment to their infants. At the present time
this lower cost is attributable largely to the fact that, given the ri-
gidity of familial patterns and workplace structures, many men have
never been given the opportunity to develop it. Moreover, lower cost
(in relation to men) should not automatically be associated with
greater pleasure in nurturing for women. The increasingly audible
discontent of women with the current division of labor in the fam-
ily"6 belies this conclusion, as the low pay and low social valuation
of those who perform childcare in place of biological mothers belies
the conclusion that the current specialization is no "sign of inferi-
ority or disrespect."27 In addition, Professor Epstein's analysis does
not account for the costs of enforcing the present arrange-
24. Epstein, supra note 1, at 990.
25. David A. Strauss, Biology, Difference, and Gender Discrimination, 41 DEPAUL L. REV,
1007 (1992).
26. See ROSANNA HERTZ, MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: WOMEN AND MEN IN DUAL CAREER
MARRIAGES (1986); HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 5.
27. On the subject of surrogacy generally, see Nancy Ehrenreich, Surrogacy as Resistance?
The Misplaced Focus on Choice in the Surrogacy and Abortion Funding Contexts, 41 DEPAUL L.
REV. 1369 (1992).
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ment-through the variety of attitudes and workplace policies de-
scribed above-that point not only to a different normative conclu-
sion, but to the fact that biology may have less of a role in ordaining
current arrangements than he suggests. 8
A final disturbing attribute of Professor Epstein's account is its
tendency to press biologically based differences into realms where
their influence becomes frankly attenuated. The idea that the divi-
sion of familial labor will make men better architects and women
better guidance counselors is one example.29 That the attributes
manifested in the workplace should be based exclusively, or even
primarily, on those cultivated in the home is an interesting yet dubi-
ous proposition. Empirical studies of work/family conflict offer us
many examples of men who bring meticulous attention to detail to
their law practices, but can't seem to see a dusty cabinet or an un-
washed dish at home.30 Moreover, the extension of the familial divi-
sion of labor to the workplace assumes that there are few other so-
cial contexts in which future workers develop the qualities that they
later' bring to the workplace. This has never been true for men, and
it is decreasingly true for women, who are now educated and em-
ployed, and often delay marriage, childrearing, and other nurturant
activities. Given this multiplicity of influences, one would expect to
see the differentiation and sex segregation, whose enduring propriety
Professor Epstein celebrates, eroding over time, if they are not re-
animated by restrictions having social as opposed to biological
origins.
An even more troubling example is Professor Epstein's assertion
that Al Unser's estimation of Janet Guthrie's race-car driving ("she
drove to finish but never to win") represents the practical, contem-
porary application of the reproductively driven difference in risk
preferences he cites."1 Most scholars would balk at taking Janet
Guthrie as representative of all women race-car drivers, or at taking
Al Unser's assessment of Janet Guthrie as representative of Janet
Guthrie. In addition, they might also demand to know the reasons
why race-car drivers should-through conscious effort or in-
stinct-apply strategies for reproductive success when entering the
28. See CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 10 (noting that social arrangements relating
to gender are often maintained by coercive force, which suggests that biological differences may
be less determinative than sociobiologists and others argue).
29. Epstein, supra note I, at 10.
30. See HOCHSCHILD & MACHUNG, supra note 5.
31. Epstein, supra note 1, at 993 n.23.
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Indy 500.32
If theories of social construction may be described as richly vary-
ing attempts to respond to the extrapolations of a surprisingly perva-
sive, roving biologism, we might ask whether proponents of Title
VII might also be described in a less monolithic fashion. My an-
swer, not surprisingly, is also, Yes. To view Title VII as seeking to
extinguish all differences-whether biologically or socially cre-
ated-between men and women in the workplace is to miss critical
aspects of recent enforcement strategy. It is more accurate to say
that Title VII is aimed at extinguishing most discrimination in the
workplace, and to this end, advocates and enforcement officials have
targeted a range of behaviors-those that neglect, as well as those
that exaggerate or reinforce, difference. In the next section, I will
focus on this multiplicity of enforcement strategies and highlight
some efforts that may require correction-though not the correction
Professor Epstein seeks.
II. TITLE VII LITIGATION: PLURAL ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES
AND THE PLURALISM OF WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE
Title VII and other civil rights laws that address discrimination
on the basis of gender were first formulated and litigated under the
influence of one of the earliest feminist theories, one that is often
referred to as equality theory. This theory, which was influenced by
the struggle of blacks for civil rights, did not deny all biological
differences, but denied their relevance to a number of institutional
settings in which they had previously been treated as determinative.
Equality theory also suggested that the failure to recognize certain
functional similarities between men and women was attributable to
episodic, irrational prejudice that could be ameliorated through edu-
cation and limited in its practical effect by vigorous enforcement. As
embodied in Title VII, equality theory has been responsible for
opening to women a range of workplaces that had not been accessi-
ble before and for challenging many preconceived notions about
women's capabilities. But over time it has become evident that
equality theory is not adequately comprehensive, either as an ac-
count of women's experience of gender discrimination or as an ap-
proach to rectifying discrimination in the workplace.
32. For a discussion and critique of the scientific evidence tracing behavior differences in ani-
mals to gender-specific strategies for reproductive success, see CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, supra
note 6, at 60-70.
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Equality theory, with its focus on women's similarities, fails to
address those forms of discrimination that arise from neglect or de-
valuation of women's differences. Because it describes gender dis-
crimination as a matter of episodic, irrational prejudice, it does not
see or untangle the set of entrenched, institutionalized attitudes that
create a system of discrimination against women. Equality theory
has also been of limited use in dealing with workplace discrimina-
tion that goes beyond problems of access. Once women entered a
range of historically male workplaces, they discovered a number of
difficulties-sexual harassment, stereotyping, failure to accommo-
date parenting-that could not easily be described as a failure to
give women what men already had.
In the face of these developments, feminist advocates and enforce-
ment officials have embraced a new goal; they have used employ-
ment discrimination law to require the workplace to accommodate
women, not simply admit them. Accommodation has meant a plural
approach to including women in the workplace: acknowledging not
just women's similarities but women's differences, whether these dif-
ferences are physical (in utero gestation), socially constructed
(greater sensitivity to pornography in the workplace), or some com-
bination of the two (primary responsibility for early child care).
This strategy has required that advocates propound a series of gen-
eralizations about women, so that employers and lawmakers know
what has to be accommodated. These generalizations, for example,
describe how women's professional life-cycles proceed, how women
perceive sexual conduct in the workplace, and how their perform-
ance and characteristics are likely to be perceived by others. It is
this second-phase strategy of accommodation through generalization
on which I want to focus here. There are largely unexamined dan-
gers that accompany such efforts, notwithstanding their potential to
move women beyond the equality-driven stages of antidiscrimination
efforts. In the remaining portion of this article, I will explore some
of these dangers and suggest ways in which they can be mitigated,
without abandoning the useful effort to require workplaces to ac-
commodate women.
We should begin by asking where one can identify this process of
generalization in antidiscrimination enforcement. There are many
answers. Some generalizations about women are offered in the pro-
cess of defining the set of people who are entitled to relief. Some
statutes may justify the creation of a class of beneficiaries by refer-
1030 [Vol. 41:1021
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ring to certain differences that distinguish them from other groups.
A statute requiring maternity leave, for example, might contain leg-
islative history describing the importance of family in the lives of
many women, the costs of work/family conflict for workers who are
mothers, or the prevalence of mothers as primary care providers. In
some litigation contexts, a generalization is offered to explain the
dynamics that justify a particular claimant's recovery. In Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,3 3 plaintiff's attorneys argued successfully
that Ann Hopkins had failed to attain her promotion because evalu-
ations of her performance were mediated by stereotypes about com-
manding women. Even in the context of individual litigation, this
strategy had broader educative purposes: Focusing on stereotyping
not only explained what Hopkins had been subjected to, but it also
illuminated the nature of the assumptions to which the average wo-
man is exposed in the workplace (for example, the fact that qualities
which would be viewed as virtues if they came in a male package
are not necessarily viewed as virtues when they come in a female
package).
A second litigation-based context in which advocates and courts
may engage in generalizations is in determining the proper perspec-
tive from which to evaluate alleged discrimination. A good example
comes from the area of sexual harassment. In cases involving hostile
environment sexual harassment, a plaintiff may recover if she can
demonstrate conduct that was "abusive" or "hostile, intimidating or
offensive." 34 The question that arises, however, is from whose van-
tage point should such conduct be assessed? For many years the
courts employed a "reasonable person" standard-judges should
evaluate the conduct in question as a "reasonable person" might.
3 5
Over time, a number of feminist scholars, including myself, began to
argue that it is difficult to develop an average, gender-neutral per-
33. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
34. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that hostile-environment
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII); see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897 (1 Ith Cir. 1982) (holding that for sexual harassment to be actionable it must be sufficiently
pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment);
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that conditions of employment include
psychological and emotional work environment, and thus subjecting an employee to sexually ste-
reotyped insults and demeaning propositions can affect the conditions of employment).
35. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the trier
of fact, when judging the totality of the circumstances of the asserted abusive and hostile environ-
ment, must adopt the perspective of a reasonable person).
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spective on sexual harassment.3 6 Empirical data suggest that women
and men respond differently to sexual overtures in the workplace,
for reasons that have to do with their security in the workplace and
their constructions of their own sexuality. 7 Rather than assert that
there is some gender-neutral, reasonable perspective on all this,
courts should acknowledge that men's and women's perspectives
vary and that, if our goal is to scrutinize conduct that has made
workplaces inhospitable to women, we ought to assess conduct from
the "reasonable woman's" perspective. Last year in Ellison v.
Brady,38 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
embraced this reasoning in a deliberate and explicit fashion. The
Ninth Circuit held that the "reasonable person" was simply a
means of instantiating a "reasonable man's" perspective in law, and
if workplace behavior was going to be reformed, the "reasonable
woman" was the necessary and appropriate standard.39 So here a set
of generalizations about women became the basis for recovery, not
by establishing who was entitled to make a claim, but by establish-
ing how assessment of claims would proceed.
At one level, there is much about this general approach that rep-
resents a step forward. It makes clear that not all employment dis-
crimination problems are problems of access, that social attitudes
and corresponding institutional practices can make a workplace un-
manageable for recent arrivals. It also demonstrates that the ten-
dency to neglect women's differences can be just as damaging as
neglecting their similarities. As part of this demonstration, the ap-
proach highlights some of the more salient differences. The "reason-
able woman" standard, for example, illustrates the distinctive per-
ceptions of sex in the workplace that distinguish many women from
many men; similarly, the claims regarding stereotyping explain how
disparate views of comparable characteristics in men and women
can give ostensibly uniform standards a discriminatory twist. Fi-
nally, litigation strategies that highlight differences in perspective,
like the "reasonable woman" approach, unmask the false universal-
ity and neutrality that abounds in law and that often works to the
36. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 22, at 1202-15 (arguing that men in the workplace "regard
conduct ranging from sexual demands to sexual innuendos differently than women," and that
"because men still exercise control over most workplaces," the norm is established by men).
37. See BARBARA GUTEK. SEX AND THE WORKPLACE (1985). The construction of the sources
of gender-based differences described in the text is offered in Abrams, supra note 22, at 1202-09.
38. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
39. Id. at 879-81.
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disadvantage of women.
At another level, however, this approach has many of the draw-
backs feminist theorists have come to associate with difference the-
ory. These include problems that arise from the use of these gener-
alizations by legal decision-makers, and problems that arise from
the application of unitary characterizations to *a highly diverse
group of women. I will illustrate these difficulties primarily by refer-
ring to the use of the "reasonable woman" standard in sexual har-
assment cases, but will include other examples as well. I should add
that this exploration reflects at least a partial revision of my earlier
view: It was my previous contention that something like a reasona-
ble woman standard should be applied in hostile environment sexual
harassment cases;"' yet the following considerations have en-
couraged me to qualify or modify this approach.
The problems that arise from the failings of decision makers are
perhaps more obvious.41 The "reasonable man" or "reasonable per-
son" standard that has historically been employed in the area of tort
has been easily applicable for one of two reasons. First, in many
cases it has been (correctly) assumed that judges could apply this
standard by consulting their own experience or intuitions as to what
the "reasonable person" would believe. Second, where judges lacked
such direct access-where the question was, for example, what a
"reasonable medical practitioner" would do-they have been willing
and able to admit expert testimony to help them. In applying the
reasonable woman standard, many contemporary judges lack both
these advantages. Despite marked gains, it is still the fact that the
vast majority of federal judges hearing sexual harassment claims are
white males. 2 This means that decision-makers lack any di-
rect-experiential or intuitive-access to how a "reasonable wo-
man" would think about sexual actions in the workplace. This lack
of intuitive access was central to the Ellison court's rationale for
adopting the standard: The reasonable woman was necessary be-
40. See Abrams, supra note 22 at 1209-15.
41. Some drawbacks to the application of gender-specific generalizations by male decision-mak-
ers are also discussed in Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology
of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990), Lucinda M. Finley,
Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 914 (1987).
42. The new civil rights statute may alleviate some of the evils identified here by allowing
parties alleging intentional discrimination to demand a jury trial. See Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1073 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1988 &
Supp. Il1 1991)).
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cause the reasonable person had become infused, through its appli-
cation, with male perspectives.13 But declari-ng a new standard is
only of limited benefit when the same decision makers approach its
application with the same experiential limitations and preconcep-
tions. Moreover, expert testimony-the usual recourse in cases
where experiential access is lacking-has not always been availing
in these cases. Part of the problem with expert testimony is the lack
of empirical data itself. Questions of what differentiates women, or
groups of women, in the workplace are only beginning to be ex-
plored as relevant to workplace research. But an even larger prob-
lem is the reluctance of some courts to allow the use of experts. The
great controversy that has surrounded the admission of expert testi-
mony in cases involving battered women's self-defense (another
question of reasonableness in women's legal actions) has become
well known." In other areas courts have sometimes been reluctant
to qualify experts because of their uncertainty about whether differ-
ent types of gender studies constitute fields, or what constitutes an
expert in such fields.
A second difficulty with decision makers arises from the still-prev-
alent tendency, remarked above, to naturalize observed differences
between men and women. One might demur that equality theory,
too, involves generalizations about women, but in our society, asser-
tions that women are similar to men are not likely to stigmatize
women. The same cannot be said of assertions that women are dif-
ferent from men. Even some judges who accept certain differences
between men's and women's perceptions of sexual harassment, for
example, may describe those differences in ways that are ultimately
stigmatizing or limiting to women. Decision makers who are unfa-
miliar with the dynamics of socialization or the complex and varia-
ble process of social construction may find it easier to ascribe differ-
ences to biology and to present them as universal or noncontingent.
Thus the differences in women's perceptions of sexual conduct in the
43. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
44. See Elizabeth Schneider et al., Lesbians, Gays and Feminists a! the Bar: Translating Per-
sonal Experience into Effective Legal Argument-A Symposium, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 107,
137-38 (1988) (discussing the importance of expert testimony to the jury's understanding of the
myths and misconceptions about battered women); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and
Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 195, 198 (1986) (stating that the purpose of expert testimony on the
battered-woman syndrome is "to explain the common experiences of, and the impact of repeated
abuse on, battered women" and "to assist the jury and the court in fairly evaluating the reasona-
bleness of the battered woman's action").
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workplace may be ascribed not to the fact that longstanding dis-
crimination has made women less secure in the workplace, nor to
the fact that the high incidence of sexual violence against women in
our society has made many women see coercion in potential sexual
encounters. Instead, differences in perceptions may be described as
transcultural, a part of the natural modesty or chastity through
which women attempt to conserve their limited reproductive
endowment.
These factors, in and of themselves, might seem to be reason
enough for hesitating about the use of a standard, such as the "rea-
sonable woman," that attempts to characterize women as a group.
But, to my mind, more important reasons to hesitate lie in the diver-
sity that exists among women. One of the most telling critiques of
difference feminism, the theoretical home of the "reasonable wo-
man" standard, is the claim that it falsely essentializes women: By
describing women as a uniform group, difference theory partakes of
the same false universalism of which difference feminists accuse the
equality-based standard." This critique also has a dimension that
relates to power inequalities: When general characterizations of
women are rendered, it is usually the most privileged groups (privi-
leged on the basis of such characteristics as race, class, or sexual
orientation) who enjoy the power to describe their own perceptions
or experiences as the norm."6 And finally, the critique questions
whether difference theory is capable of providing a full account of
discrimination: If white, straight, middle-class women's experiences
are described, even by implication, as all women's experiences, we
will lose the opportunity to study, understand, and remediate the
forms of discrimination suffered by less-privileged women, which are
no less "gender" discrimination because of their intersectional
45. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10, 12 (1987) (arguing that refusing to acknowledge differences such as race,
gender, religion, or membership in any other group perpetuates their importance in "a world with
some groups, but not others, in mind") [hereinafter Minow, Justice Engendered]; Martha Minow,
Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 47-48 (1988) (noting that
feminists seeking a "female" point of view run the risk of "ignoring differences of racial, class,
religious, ethnic, national, and other situated experiences").
46. See SPELMAN, supra note 4 (noting that the focus on women "as women" in feminist theory
reflects the experience of only one group of women-white, middle-class women from Western,
industrialized countries); Harris, supra note 3; Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 45, at 62-
70 (stating that ignoring differences among women permits "relatively privileged women to claim
identification with all discrimination against women, while also claiming special authority to speak
for women unlike themselves").
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characteristics. 4 7
We can see these dangers of essentialism in many of the differ-
ence-based strategies I described at the outset. The "reasonable
woman" is a useful device for exploding the notions that everybody
thinks about sexual conduct in the workplace the same way, and
that gender socialization has nothing to do with it. But it seems
likely, based on evidence both popular and scholarly, that not all
women think about sexual conduct in the workplace in the same
way. Take, for example, the Thomas-Hill hearings: There was wide-
spread agreement among women that the harassment question de-
manded fuller hearings, but once those hearings had been held there
was far less agreement about what they had demonstrated. One of
the most interesting anecdotal findings I read was that many work-
ing class women tended to display less sympathy with Professor Hill
than professional women. These women described a long history of
looking out for themselves in coercive environments and faulted Hill
for not doing the same.48 At a more theoretical level, when I think
about the factors that some scholars, including myself, have identi-
fied as most important to shaping one's attitudes toward sexual con-
duct in the workplace-one's sense of security in the workplace and
one's understanding or construction of one's own sexuality-there is
good reason to believe that both of these factors vary among groups
of women.49 One of the great risks in going too far down the road
toward the reasonable woman-at least, without assessment of its
potential costs-is that the reasonable woman will begin to sound a
lot like a white, straight, upper-middle-class professional, thereby
excluding the perceptions and experiences of a majority of women
who actually occupy the workplace. These difficulties have already
emerged in some of the other areas I mentioned. For example, in the
47. See SPELMAN, supra note 4; Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and An-
tiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Harris, supra note 3, at 585 (arguing that a unitary
"essential" women's experience, viewed independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other
realities, silences the same voices that the mainstream legal voice silences).
48. See, e.g., Saundra Torry & Patrice Gaines-Carter, TV Brings Senate's Gripping Public
Drama to Area Shops, Offices, WASH. POST. Oct. 12, 1991, at A7 (quoting hair stylist Shirley
Noble: "I still don't see if this man sexually harassed her in 1981, why she wanted'to keep in
contact with him up until last year."); Dirk Johnson, The Thomas Nomination: Puzzled and
Disgusted, but Fixated on Hearings, N.Y. TIMES. Oct. 14, 1991, at A16 (reporting store clerk
Virginia Danner's description of Anita Hill as a "tattletale").
49. For several interesting narrative descriptions of the way that race and class can influence
the construction of women's sexuality, see CHERIE MORAGA & GLORIA ANZALDUA, THIS BRIDGE
CALLED My BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (1981).
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area of stereotyping, Ann Hopkins was able to recover for discrimi-
nation on the basis of a stereotype that afflicts white, upper-middle-
class professional women (the domineering, aggressive manager),
yet other women have not been as successful in recovering where
they alleged compound stereotypes-such as those involving gender
and weight, or gender and age, or gender and religion.5 Similarly,
in some recent cases, courts have held that black women may not
serve as class representatives in a class action claiming violation of
Title VII on behalf of all women in a particular workplace.5 1
So what is to be done about all of this? Must we abandon the
advantages of generalizing about women's differences and women's
treatment because of these difficulties? And does antiessential-
ism-defined as the practice of insisting on the diversity of women
as a group-offer anything better for directing a program of femi-
nist antidiscrimination litigation? Is it, as some critics suggest, so
inherently fragmenting that it will offer little around which to con-
struct a positive program? These are, to my mind, the next large set
of questions facing feminist theorists, as antiessentialism begins to
move from critique to prescriptive program. But I suspect that in
antidiscrimination litigation, as in other areas, they can be ad-
dressed in ways that strike useful balances between the need to say
something about women as a group, and the need to understand and
acknowledge all the groups that make up women. What approaches
will work best will vary in different circumstances, but I will suggest
several strategies that may be of use.
In factual circumstances where we are only beginning to learn
about the differences among women, two kinds of steps can combat
the difficulties with decision makers I discussed earlier. 2 The first is
to make sure that all accounts of women's distinctive patterns, all
50. See Madeline Morris, Stereotypic Alchemy: Transformative Stereotypes and Antidis-
crimination Law, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 251 (1989) (stating that in discrimination cases in-
volving a combination of suspect and nonsuspect characteristics, the nonsuspect characteristic,
such as weight, may be used as a vehicle for discriminating against a suspect class). The 1991 Act
should be of help to plaintiffs complaining of improper workplace behavior involving compound
stereotypes. In so-called mixed-motive cases, once the plaintiff establishes that an impermissible
criterion (gender) was a "motivating factor" in an employment decision, she has made out a
violation of Title VII. To limit the relief awarded to the plaintiff, the employer may then show
that it would have taken the same action without the presence of the forbidden factor. Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(B) (1988 & Supp. I11 1991)).
51. For a description and incisive critique of these cases, see Crenshaw, supra note 47.
52. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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characterizations of the "reasonable woman," are linked to full ac-
counts of whatever highly contingent social construction tends to
generate these differences. This approach does not mean that biolog-
ical explanations should be banished, but rather that where biology
is not the cause of differentiation or where its influence is shaped or
amplified by social construction, these social and institutional influ-
ences should be spelled out. This may keep judges and other deci-
sion makers from naturalizing the differences they hear. Of course,
this is often easier said than done. When I advocated a modified
reasonable woman standard in 1989, 1 steeped the attitudes I de-
scribed in detailed accounts of social construction. When the Ninth
Circuit decided Ellison last year, it adopted the "reasonable wo-
man" standard, cited my argument, and eliminated any emphasis on
the social construction of differences. Still, the effort to make the
connection strikes me as highly valuable: Some courts may be more
receptive to a full account, and whether or not they adopt it, they
may become more familiar with the notion of socially constructed
differences as a result of hearing these kinds of arguments.
The second step that can be taken to address the problems with
decision makers is to continue empirical work on the sources of dif-
ferences among women. In addition, antidiscrimination lawyers need
to familiarize themselves with the work that exists. We already have
a store of telling experiential accounts that document differences
among women, and my point here is not to derogate such accounts
or set up an epistemological hierarchy. But we need to learn about
differences in as many ways as possible, and we need to document
these differences in ways that courts will accept. Where a body of
knowledge on difference is well established, expert testimony on
women (on stereotypes, "reasonable women," or anything else) is
more likely to be admitted.54
In circumstances where information about differences among
women is well established, advocates can do one of several things to
avoid the problems of essentialism I described earlier. The first is to
use the full body of information regarding such differences as the
factual base from which to draw any generalizations about women.
53. It is worth noting, however, that the Ellison court did not rely on a biological explanation.
In fact, it eschewed any explanation or implication regarding how such differences have emerged.
See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-81 (9th Cir. 1991).
54. For an interesting discussion of the role of expert testimony in sexual harassment cases, see
Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in Sexual and
Racial Harassment Litigation, I TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 95 (1992).
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This approach still has the problem of false universalism: Whenever
one generalizes about a factual base, one risks slighting differences
in favor of similarities, or highlighting some differences while sub-
merging others. But at least with a factual base that reflects differ-
ences among women, we are more likely to mitigate the inequalities
of power: Generalizations will be based on a range of women's expe-
rience rather than on the experiences of privileged women alone.
Still better might be an approach that does not attempt to create a
modal woman, but rather confronts the litigation-driven need for
unity -by making an explicit, normative choice about how to charac-
terize women for litigation purposes. Some feminist scholars, for ex-
ample, have begun to think about characterizing the "reasonable
woman" in sexual harassment litigation in this way. Martha
Chamallas has argued that the "reasonable woman" should be one
who is aware of patterns of subordination in the workplace and
wants to ameliorate them. 5 I might suggest, instead, that we articu-
late a portrait of the "most vulnerable woman" (who, as the
Thomas-Hill hearings suggest, is not necessarily the least-privileged
woman), and use that woman's perspective as the standpoint for
evaluating sexual conduct in the workplace.
A final proposal for reflecting the diversity that exists among
women is to increase reliance on nonlitigated solutions. This is one
important area in which Professor Epstein and I see eye to eye,
though obviously for different reasons. The need for unity in charac-
terization may be tempered in the litigation context, but it is surely
stronger here than in prophylactic contexts such as workplace edu-
cation programs. Educational programs that rely on narrative strat-
egies (for example, exposing male employees to women's accounts of
the experience of sexual harassment) might produce greater flexibil-
ity and sensitivity in their audiences by highlighting the variety of
women's perceptions and experiences. An emphasis on such pro-
grams would, importantly, spare plaintiffs the expense and emo-
tional anguish that accompany even a successful Title VII suit.
Such efforts would amount-to little were they-not backed by the
potential sanction of litigation; but operating in the shadow of legal
enforcement, they can be used to reformulate workplace conduct
while helping to bring women's differences to light.
55. Id.
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11. CONCLUSION
When gender-specific differences are understood to be complex,
changeable phenomena rather than biologically ordained mandates,
and Title VII is revealed to respect as well as to eradicate such dif-
ferences, the case for Professor Epstein's draconian solutions be-
comes less clear. Title VII is an imperfect instrument, capable of
complicating women's emancipation as well as increasing employers'
costs. Yet a fuller understanding of the past and present situation of
women argues more powerfully for revision than for repeal.
